Strong, Secure, Engaged

As CIA’s Technical Service Division in Far East, Air Asia in Taiwan had accomplished 30,000 sorties on the legendary F-4 Phantom II jet during the Vietnam War.  Since the late 1960s, the Red China has made significant improvements to its armed forces, a challenge that was driving Taiwan’s intent for a modern F-4 strength.  For purchasing the Free China’s first F-4D squadron in the next fiscal year, the US House of Representatives reluctantly earmarked a budget of 54.5M on Dec. 10, 1969.  Despite the clear need for Chinese Air Force’s ultimate dream weapon, the island state’s requirement was immediately plunged into the political realm amid Washington’s subtle overtures hinting at warmer relations to the Red China.  

Since the US House of Representatives marginally passed providing the F-4 jets to Taiwan by 176 vs. 169 votes on Nov. 20, 1969, the bill has served as a political football for the Congress and Nixon administration.  With none side jockeying in an attempt to come on top, Taiwan was desperate while Chinese position has prevailed with its political clout.  On Dec. 25, the White House declared against the special budget for exporting the McDonnell Douglas F-4 to Taiwan.  Soon both House of Representatives and Senate canceled the bill of Taiwan Phantom acquisition.

In the end, Taiwan’s humiliating solicitation turned out to be a wake-up call for its fighter self-sustainability.  Target on air defence gap, Gen. C.T. Yeh (葉昌桐) met with the COs of the United States Taiwan Defense Command and Military Assistance Advisory Group in 1972.  Surprisingly, the American agreed with Yeh’s co-operation on the new F-5E light weight fighter.  In 1973 the CAF Aero Industry Development Center started the Tiger-II Program (虎安計劃) to build Northrop F-5E single seaters and F-5F two-seat conversion trainers.  In only 21 months, the first CAF F-5E tactical fighter was rolled out for public viewing on Oct 30, 1974, breaking the records of all the Tiger-II joint venture with Northrop.  Around a quarter of the overall Tiger-II production were built in Taiwan, totally 242 Es and 66 Fs emerged from the AIDC Shuinan plant in 1974-86.

Nothing Comes Without a Cost

From the imported MiG-9 jet of 1950, to the national pride of indigenous stealth fighters via copied Russian types cross millennium, Chinese aviation engineers worked all their lives to get where they are today.  Since its first successful MiG-17 copy (Re-designated J-5) in 1956, nearly 10,000 aircraft churned out under dozens of designations.  This industrialization is achieved through a long struggling, its success have eventually outperformed the grotesque neighbor on measures of defense might.  Especially right after the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979, its air power modernization changed from flying artillery to air superiority dominance. 

When China proudly unveils its KJ-200, KJ-2000 J-10, J-11, and J-15 in dazzling Zhuhai 2016 and previous air shows, there were several unsuccessful projects, namely, J-8, J-9, J-12 and J-13 etc. were aborted.  Though these designs became obsolete even before accomplished, they laid the foundation of the integral development of the overall aviation industry.  After its Maoist-fueled isolationism sentiment diminished in 1978, Grumman joined the Shenyang Aircraft Corp. (Plant 112)'s J-8 project under the code Engineering 82 in 1986.  In this unparalleled 14 years R&D, it's rival, Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corp. (Plant 132)'s J-10 project surpassed J-8 by a decade, soon the CAIC was chosen to produce Boeing 757's empennage and MD-80/9o's nose section.

China has the ability of have a coherent conversation and achieve consensus, on topics of national importance, then real progress become possible.  Unlike this longing for self-sustainability, Taiwan heads big-ticket weaponry purchase in an apparently misguided attempt to pay its protection fee to the US.  In a standoff air combat, the J-11 with ZHUK-M radar can easily outclass both Taiwanese Mirage 2000-5 with Mica missile, and F-16MLR with AIM-120 missile; let along the superb maneuverable J-15 in dog fight.  Lucky for the intentionally blinded Taiwanese not falling on this issue.  Across the Taiwan Strait, the historical march toward a more stable and less violent era continues, but not without chilly times ahead for the island state.

Reform and Opening Up Thrust

Until mid-1990s, J-8 and Su-27 were the only modern types in the Chinese fighter strength, but they were only 2.5% of a huge fleet of over 5,000 planes.  In the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident, the western world, e.g. Italy and U.S. imposed technology blockade against China.  Afterwards in their place came Israel Aircraft Industry (IAI) and Russian Siberian Aeronautical Research Institute (SibNIA).  In order to upgrade in-demand avionics, fire control and powerplant technologies, which hampered at least four pilot fighter projects, the new strategy incorporate a melting pot of foreign technology and acquired design methods.

Entered full scale R/D, primarily on avionics and fire control, J-8II emerged as a multirole, all-weather fighter.  Within the span of four decades, there were about 300 J-8 variants in People's Liberation Army Air Force and Navy Air Force service as of early 2011.  If not match the U.S. and Russian counterparts, its interception, close air support, and interdiction capabilities are still regionally unchallenged.  Furthermore, its Russain Zhuk radar also supported J-10 fighter.  As a replacement of aging J-6 and J-7, IAI Lavi’s nine controls surfaces and Su-27’s engine are adopted by J-10, such that it is as agile as F-16.

Unlike J-8, J-10, and Su-27 variants serve both PLAAF and PLAN, JH-7 fighter bomber only fly with PLAN due to its early buggy design.  Its payload was restricted by the underpowered licensed-built Spey turbofan, a 1960s design.  However, a muscly naval fast deploy force was formed with upgraded JH-7B.  It features increased payload, a brand new avionics system, and a more powerful engine.  Its combat radius is extended via aerial refueling capability.  These boosts aren't ripple, there are full-on waves.  Opening up and progress on one side of Taiwan Strait does not mean rocky path ahead for other side, unless it is seized by continuous inward-looking and self-defeating populist movements.

Cleared for Takeoff?

A Chinese copy of the Antonov An-12, Y-8 has become the workhorse of PROC’s airlift strength from 1980; and its growth is a microcosm of New China.  Since 1949, PROC’s development has lurched forward like a man with one strong leg to pull him ahead and one gimp limb dragging behind.  A leg of industrial potential and a limb of Maoist cult, Chinese progress frenemy to the future had its shoelaces tied together until the Reform and Opening-up in 1978.  Lack of modern military and civilian transport/cargo carrier, in 1968 the Department of Aviation Industry (3^rd Mechanical Engineering Department) issued the Y-8 specifications.  Later its R/D in the Shanxi Aircraft Corporation was impeded by the political hotheadedness.

In 1972-75 most superintendents of the 3^rd MED were purged and replaced by party reps.  These political commissars may be the right men for puffing up Mao's Cultural Revolution, but at wrong time in aviation development.  They never accomplished an objective and consistent measure for manufacturing planning, while valuable time and countless resources were wasted.  However, silver linings among the threatening political clouds.  In 1980, the Y-8 design was finalized and mass production started.  By 2010, Y-8 is reported 169 units had been built.  Among its 26 variants, Y-8C full air-tight type is the major product in the Y-8 family, and the first medium size/medium range tactical transport over the Chinese sky.

In addition to Y-8, neither aviation programs, nor any project at all turned out to be progressing smoothly during the riotous Maoist era.  The Chinese Communism is unambiguously negative for the state, which is based on losing-ideology and could descend into chaos as party leaders vie for control.  When a Y-8 variant, KJ-200 AWACS, pompously unveiled in 2014 Zhuhai air show, dangerous rivalries were cleared by thousands nationwide.  Then a state awash with heavy weaponry almost tear open this finely woven patchwork of loyalties, with party’s oligarchies still fail to fall in line.

Kill Loss Ratio 31:1

The first combat use of the air-to-air missile was on Sep 24, 1958, with the Republic of China Air Force when the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis  came to flare-up.  The Red China had pursued invading Taiwan since 1949, 1958 Mao kicked it into high gear again.  During the conflict, CAF F-86 Sabres were routinely engaged in air battles with swarms of MiG-17.  In a top secret effort, an Aviation Ordnance Team of one pilot and five techies from the USMC 323 Fighter Squadron delivered 40 GAR-8 Sidewinders to CAF 11^th FG on Aug 18, and modify their North American jets to carry the GAR-8.  Under a direct order from the U.S. Pacific Command, the operation was supervised by the Military Assistance Advisory Group.  Though the GAR-8 transfer from the sole missile-equipped Naval FJ-4 unit (323 Sqn), the 7^th Fleet was bypassed.  The project: rearmed Sabre to suppress the more agile MiG-17, and developed new missile tactics to prevail over future threats.

After one week, five staffers came up with innovative missile launcher based on the original F-86F’s high velocity aircraft rocket system.  In the test flight, pilot Ray Robbins fired a HVAR from his left wing pylon, then it was successfully blasted by a chasing GAR-8 from his right wing pylon.  In the next two weeks, CAF mechanics upgraded 20 F-86s under the AOT guidance, each plane carried two GAR-8s.  Chinese pilots kept up change fast, especially the limitations of this heat-seeking missile, i.e. relative position of sun, fire range, search angle, and operational ceiling.  Meanwhile, their new tactics was sharpened via mock combat with CAF F-100 as an “aggressor aircraft”.

Facing a massive foe, the smaller CAF was more than holding its own; its strength lay in pilot’s quality and advanced weaponry.  To specify the Communist’s intention of non-stop bombardment, CAF launched a large scale recon along mainland coast on Sep 24, with four retrofitted F-86s as core flight in the escort groups.  In the first encounter, the Sabre quad wiped out six unaware MiG-17s in a climbing ambush.  The MiGs broke formation and dived to the altitude of the Sabres in swirling dogfights, six more was destroyed by 50 calibers.  After the total kill loss rate of 31:1 in Taiwan Strait Crisis, Red’s short live air dominance had gone dark for decades.

Nukes in Taiwan

Known as the 1958 second Taiwan Strait crisis, the Red’s shelling of Kinmen was primarily a political blitzkrieg rather than a military invasion.  After the outpost islet was obscured by the dust of exploding volleys, the U.S. 7^th Fleet escort dumped the ROC Navy’s landing craft and escaped from the scene.  As such, Mao Zedong clarified that the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty for Taiwan was simply a half-assed US ploy to later pave the way for 1979 US-China normalization.  However, the crisis aftermath was a subtle win-win situation for both ROC and PROC, while ROC refused to retreat from Kinmen under the US pressure.  Kinmen remained a geopolitical link between the mainland and Taiwan and Chinese on both sides successfully shunned the US’s China-splitting policy.

Hard pressed to withstand the Red’s onslaught, the first three newly-arrived M-55 self-propelled howitzers roared to life on September 26, and immediately their 8-inch guns overwhelmed the enemy shellfire.  After the conflict, the cross-strait barrage became the Chinese Civil War’s longest running battle, though both sides merely exchanged desultory harassing fire on odd days of the month, then used pamphlet shells only.  It also bears remembering that in 1958 Kinmen was bleak and the casualties were over 7,000 in the series of battles from Aug. 23 to Oct. 5, but by then the ROC serviceman were not made of fine China.  They were very good at their job, and luckily the islet saw the urgent deployment of twelve 8-inch guns that were decisive in the 8.23 Barrage Battle.

The Reds unleashed the shelling at the height of the Cold War, and ever since the US nukes had stayed in Taiwan until 1974 with the US Matador cruise missile standing ready at Tainan Air Base when the crisis erupted.  In storage on the revetments adjacent to the Tainan AFB flight line, the Matador TM-61Cs were operated by the 868^th Tactical Missile Squadron, and supported by the 6214^th Air Base Group.    In 1959, surface-to-surface nuclear warheads were deployed, the Matador could deliver a 20 kt W5 warhead to a range of 965 km from Tainan.  On Okinawa and Guam, three types of nukes - Mk.6 (only Guam), Mk.36 Mod 1, and Mk.39 Mod 0 - were available to defeat the possible attacking PROC forces.  Unsurpringly, in 1978 the US recognized the PROC as the sole legal government of China, also ended official relations and its defense treaty with Taiwan.

The View from the Top

Affected by the previous amphibious landing on Dachen incurring of heavy casualties, Mao ZeDong rejected the PLA’s both proposals of air raid and amphibious assault on Kinmen.  His barrage-only insistence was based on the considerations: First, poor air ground coordination was still the soft belly of PLA; a barrage battle was political and diplomatic oriented, for identifying US’s specific intent without being beleaguered.  Second, taking fortress-like Kinmen held by six divisions would be suicidal, leaving it as a geopolitical link was more beneficial to Chinese interest.  Third, Taiwan’s retaliation thrusting into coastal area was fully expected, even a dangerous confrontation with the US if PLAAF bombed Kinmen.  Fourth, an expensive amphibious attack’s outcome had never been in question while Taiwan had the air superiority.  His strategy worked, it has the effect of making the obvious seem complex.       

Accessed the real US attitude, China managed to reopen the 1954 Geneva Conference in Warsaw, in order to delapidate the US support to Taiwan.  After the last major barrage on Jan. 7, 1959, 30 240mm howitzer M-1 were transferred to Kinmen and Matsu to guard against potential Reds aggression, ever since these big guns were in active service but not surprisingly, never came into action.  And the ferocious M-55 self-propelled howitzers were replaced by 8” towed gun M-115s.  Went into hiatus, both sides merely exchanged desultory fire on odd days of the month, shunned military targets and villages.  Listened to the supersized loudspeakers of broadcasting station in Kinmen, the Red’s artillery walked shells up the rise paddy if they mistakenly hit the road.  

The massive US aid was given significant credit for air and counter-barrage victories, it also accelerated the ROC Army into missile age.  For re-enforcing the medium and high-altitude long-range air defense over northern Taiwan, in 1958 a SAM-A-25 heavy surface-to-air missile battalion was urgent deployed at Lingkou from Anchorage, Alaska.  As one of the five Nike Hercules export recipients, the complete battalion equipment was transferred to the ROCA on Aug. 15, 1959.  In 1971 the second Nike battalion with a conventional warhead was received from Texas, which stationed at Gangshan in southern Taiwan.  All twelve Nike companies were deactivated in 1997, without ever being fired in anger.